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REVIEWS

THORsTEN SELLIN [Ed.]

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. By H. C. Un-

derhill, 4th ed. by John L. Niblack, xxviii+1691 pp. The BobbsMerrill Co., Indianapolis, 1935.
$15.00.
The editor of the new edition of
this book tells us that "as a practical
handbook for use in criminal courts,
Underhill on Criminal Evidence is
unexcelled. In bulk, the book may
be unexcelled by a single volume on
any subject. It is half again as large
as the 1923 edition, despite omission
of the table of cases-the increase
being due to the addition of new
cases, to amplification of the subject
of Expert Testimony, and to inclusion of new chapters on Identifying
Evidence, Visual Evidence, and Receiving Stolen Property. Although
the range of topics touched upon
somewhere in the book is very wide,
a brief examination reveals the following important omissions, which
may or may not be .typical of the
contents in general; blood analysis,
and the tests to establish non-paternity; the recent requirements in
some states regarding notice of alibi
as a defense; the New York receiving stolen property rule regarding
presumptions raised against dealers;
rules in several states regarding
comment on the defendant's failure
to testify; and the very important
developments in a number of states
completly discarding the common
law methods and tests of proving
insanity and adopting quite modern
procedures.

The entire book is characterized
by disjointed generalization that is
anything but analysis, by indiscriminate cumulation of case materials,
and by most of the other confusion
and superficiality that enter into the
construction of many of the practical books for lawyers' use.
To observe specifically the sort ot
thing that one here encounters, consider the statement that "It is the
general rule that the state has the
burden of proving all the necessary
ingredients of a crime, including the
criminal intention, and this rule
logically casts the burden of proving the sanity of an accused person
upon the prosecution in the first instance" (p. 597). But immediately
following that we are told that "The
prevailing view seems to be that an
allegation that the defendant is insane is a statement of an independent
fact, and is, in its nature, a plea of
confession and avoidance. Hence,
if insanity is pleaded as a defense,
the burden of proof is on the defendant, in conformity with the general rule that he who asserts any
affirmative fact has the burden of
proof, and if he fails to prove his
insanity, he is presumed sane" (pp.
599-601).
Such juxtaposition of
contradictory rules produces a jumble of authority; and, in addition to
confusing the burden of introducing
evidence with the burden of proof,
there is no indication and apparently
no awareness that there are several
conflicting theories. The best that
can be said of the work is that it
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may serve as an index to the case
materials.
What has happened in the case of
Underhill on CriminalEvidence may
be surmised: published first in 1898
and having but little competition, it
achieved an important niche in the
lawyer's bookshelf. Then in 1904
Wigmore published his mounmental
treatise-one of the very great legal
works in modern times. At least
one other relatively helpful American book-this exclusively on Criminal Evidence-is available. Then
why Underhill? The reason hardly
reflects credit upon the training or
the scholarship of the Bench and
Bar. That a work like Underhilt
and countless others - pitchforked
mountains of case materialsshould be re-issued time after time
despite the publication of scholarly
treatises, is, unfortunately, rather
conclusive in itself. And the stupendous number of reversals because
of evidentiary errors further indicates the confusion in the field as
well as the incompetence of courts
and practitioners.
All of which becomes especially
significant when one considers the
relationship of the law of evidence
to the problems of demonstration
and persuasion. Certainly there is
great and persistent need to continue to provide thorough critiques
of evidence in the light of the best
contemporary empirical (chiefly social) science. A mere handful of
scholars has made valuable contributions, and most of these have been
fragmentary. Others have essayed
the task, and departed shortly for
"purer" or-more tender fields. Yet
Criminal Evidence, to confine oneself
to that branch, precedes and parallels, admits or rejects, weighs and
conditions, the whole stream of fact
and knowledge bearing upon crim-
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inal litigation. The rules of evidence, like others, have had their
origin in the past, and have been
colored by the cultural milieu and
molded by the knowledge existing in
the past. They have been constantly
modified as ideas have changed and
knowledge has increased. But such
improvement has lagged far behind
scientific discovery. And all-toofrequently has it been haphazard.
What a world of interest and enlightenment could be turned up by
painstaking researches: How do
the rules stack up with the best current knowledge? That is the persistent problem. Doggedly and critically and skeptically it should be
pursued. In some instances, e. g.,
ballistics and fingerprints, the rules
have caught up with science. But
consider, for example: what are the
rules of evidence governing bastardy
proceedings? And what is known in
bio-chemistry regarding paternity
and non-paternity? What are the
various rules and legal theories regarding proof of "insanity"? And
what of contemporary psychologic
knowledge regarding mental disease? What are the rules regarding
"consciousness of guilt"? And what
does psychiatry provide that may
cause one to pause frequently, if
not to reject, the legal formulas generally? Confessions, use of drugs.
of alcohol (cf. the Swedish and
other provisions for laboratory tests
and the consequent availability of
precise data), the weighing of testimony in the light of what psychology offers as to seeing, remembering,
exaggerating, suggestibility, the results of cross-examination as compared with those obtained by uninterrupted narrative-these are only
a few links in an endless chain of
evidentiary problems that await

956

BOOK REVIEWS

courageous, critical, broadly equipped
explorers.
JEROME HALL.

Louisiana State University
School of Law.

DER MODERNE TATERBEGRIFF UND DER
DEUTSCHE STRAFGESETZENTWURF.

[The Modern Concept of Criminal Participation and the GerBy
man Draft Penal Code.]
Richard Lange. vi+79 pp. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin,
1935.
KRIMINALISTISCHER

EINE

REISE

BERICHT

NACH

UBER

AMIERIKA.

[Criminological Report on a
Journey to the United States.]
By Franz Exiner. 85 pp. Walter
de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1935.
RM2.50.
BEITR*GE ZUR LE-RE vO~f ADHX[Contributions to
SIONSPROZESS.

the Doctrine of the "Adhesion"
Procedure.] By Adolf Schinke.
xii+179 pp. Walter de Gruyter
& Co., Berlin, 1935.
All three of these studies reflect
in various degrees the influence of
the National Socialist revolution upon German jurisprudence. Every
revolution necessarily leads to a reshaping of the existing legal system,
and the most radical changes are
usually made in the criminal code.
But while on some occasions this
process has been accomplished with
a minimum of ideological fanfare,
such empiricism is alien to the German temperament. There is probably no country in the wiorld where
the general doctrines and problems
of the criminal law in all their ramifications have been subjected to
such exhaustive examination as in
Germany. It is therefore certainly
not surprising that the pending Nazi

criminal code should lead to a thorough reexamination of all the old
problems. If the American jurist
who has read this type of literature
before the revolution has sometimes
felt that it was a little too theoretical and impractical, he will be
led to even greater musing by the
present flood of studies of which the
three at present under review are
fair samples. This feeling is not
due so much to the fact that the
theories which are propounded have
no scientific validity as to the existence of a doubt that the principles
can be applied under the conditions
of dictatorship. The subtleties of
the general doctrines of the criminal
law necessarily presuppose for their
successful application a. degree of
judicial objectivity which may be
presumed to be non-existent in the
present Reich. In current German
criminal theory there is much that
is admirable in the abstract. We
are now often told, for instance, that
criminal doctrines must not contravene the "popular consciousness"
and that law and morals must be
rerconciled but haw shall the Volksgeist (which has been in cold storage since Savigny) make itself felt?
It might be supposed that the popular consciousness would be pretty
inarticulate in the present German
state. The new German code will
in general be based upon positivist
principles which are fine in themselves but somehow positivism and
dictatorship have become inseparable companions.
These melancholy reflections are
justified most by Doctor Lange's
study of the doctrine of criminal
participation in relation to the pending draft of a German penal code.
To be sure the American jurist interested in the criminal law can
Doctor
learn
something
from
Lange's review of the controversy

